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Statutory fraud or not? 
 
 
The possibility of fraud lurks easily in the context of a mortgage transaction 
(as recently exemplified by the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in 
Young v Hoger [2001] QCA 461).  A relatively novel issue, involving an 
allegation of fraudulent behaviour, arose for consideration by Justice Wilson in 
Unic v Quartermain Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 403 
 
Facts 
 
In 1997 the applicant commenced a proceeding in the Supreme Court 
claiming 1,212,425.93 french francs for goods sold and delivered to C.  On 22 
December 2000 C was ordered to pay the amount claimed but the judgment 
debt remained unpaid. 
 
Before judgment was given in favour of the applicant, in February 1999, the 
respondent (a company incorporated in the Bahamas) lent $500,000US to C 
by way of an interest only loan payable on demand.  Amongst other 
securities, the respondent company obtained the benefit of a third registered 
mortgage over 2 of C’s properties. 
 
The applicant submitted that C so controlled the respondent mortgagee 
company that they were “in loose terms, one and the same entity”.  It was 
further submitted that the mortgage transaction in question was a fraudulent 
transaction designed to defeat C’s creditors.  The effect of the fraud alleged 
was to deplete the value of the assets against which the applicant could 
enforce its judgment.  The applicant had lodged an enforcement warrant 
against both properties. 
 
The applicant sought a declaration that the respondent company’s mortgage 
be removed from the relevant titles.  In seeking this relief, reliance was placed 
on s187 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld).  Section 187(1) provides that the 
Supreme Court may make the order it considers just where there has been 
fraud by the registered proprietor.  An order, directed to the Registrar of Titles, 
to cancel or correct the indefeasible title for a lot is specifically contemplated 
by the terms of s187(2) of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). 
 
If substantiated, did the applicant’s submissions constitute fraud in the 
statutory sense?  Critical to this determination was the fact that the applicant 
was not deprived of an interest in land. 
 
Decision 
 
As a matter of law, Justice Wilson concluded that the applicant was not 
entitled to the relief sought in the application.  For this reason, it was not 
necessary for Justice Wilson to reach a final conclusion concerning whether 
the respondent mortgagee was an arm’s length financier, although the 
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circumstances arousing a suspicion of a pre-existing relationship between C 
and the respondent were duly noted (at para [15]. 
 
In dismissing the application, Justice Wilson confirmed that statutory fraud 
embraces less, not more, than the species of fraud that, at common law, 
founds the rescission of a conveyance.  Further, statutory fraud is not itself 
generative of legal rights and obligations; its role being to qualify the operation 
of the doctrine of indefeasibility (para 22).  Section 187 of the Land Title Act 
1994 (Qld):“does not operate to expand the concept of fraud or the persons 
who may seek redress in consequence of it” (at para [26]) 
 
The fraud alleged was fraud to defeat creditors but the applicant creditor had 
no interest in the land.  The applicant’s enforcement warrant did not give the 
applicant any interest in the land (Bond v McClay [1903] St R Qd 1).  As 
statutory fraud affords an exception to the conclusiveness of the particulars in 
the freehold land registry, Justice Wilson noted that it was not surprising that 
counsel was unable to cite any cases of statutory fraud that did not have the 
effect of depriving someone else of an interest in the land. 
 
The fraud alleged, depleting the value of the assets against which judgment 
could be enforced, was not sufficient to constitute fraud in the statutory sense.  
To be successful a defrauded party needed to demonstrate a causal link 
between the fraud and the defrauded party’s loss of an interest in the land.  In 
this instance, as the applicant had not suffered the loss of an interest in land, 
the critical causal link was missing. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision in Unic v Quartermain Holdings Pty Ltd [2001] QSC 403 
demonstrates that a causal link between the fraud alleged and the defrauded 
party’s loss of an interest in land will be a necessary element in any 
successful application under s187 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld) 
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